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BETWEEN BENEFIT AND ABUSE: IMMIGRANT INVESTMENT 
PROGRAMS 
LEILA ADIM* 
INTRODUCTION 
During the last thirty years, an increasing number of countries have 
introduced Immigrant Investment Programs (“IIPs”) in order to attract foreign 
capital and boost national economies.1 Canada, St. Kitts and Nevis, the United 
States, and Dominica initially implemented IIPs in the late 1980s/early 1990s; 
in the rest of the world, IIPs have been adopted only recently.2 In particular, 
except for Ireland and the United Kingdom,3 European countries avoided the 
introduction of similar programs for attracting foreign capital and, until the last 
decade, admitted immigrant investors on a discretional basis.4 However, the 
recession in 2008 induced many states of the European Union (“EU”) to change 
their approach toward immigrant investors and to regard IIPs as instruments for 
emerging from the crisis.5 Nowadays, these programs exist in almost half of the 
continent and represent the gateway of entry for many wealthy foreign 
individuals, but what is their overall impact at the domestic and at the global 
level?  
 
* Faculty of Law, University of Barcelona (SPAIN), ladimadi8@alumnes.ub.edu. 
 1. Judith Gold & Ahmed El-Ashram, A Passport of Convenience, FIN. & DEV., Dec. 2015, 
at 48, 48–49. 
 2. Xin Xu, Ahmed El-Ashram & Judith Gold, Too Much of a Good Thing? Prudent 
Management of Inflows Under Economic Citizenship Programs 4 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working 
Paper WP/15/93, May 2015), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp1593.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MKR7-LV4U]. 
 3. Id. 
 4. SERGIO CARRERA, HOW MUCH DOES EU CITIZENSHIP COST? THE MALTESE 
CITIZENSHIP-FOR-SALE AFFAIR: A BREAKTHROUGH FOR SINCERE COOPERATION IN CITIZENSHIP 
OF THE UNION? 1 (CEPS Paper in Liberty & Sec. in Eur., No. 64, April 2014), 
https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/LSE%20No%2064%20Price%20of%20EU%20Citizenship%20
final2.pdf [https://perma.cc/PH5D-N6DH] (recognizing that EU Member States’ discretion over 
nationality laws has been reshaped). 
 5. MADELEINE SUMPTION & KATE HOOPER, MIGRATION POLICY INST., SELLING VISAS AND 
CITIZENSHIP: POLICY QUESTIONS FROM THE GLOBAL BOOM IN INVESTOR IMMIGRATION 3 (2014); 
Owen Parker, Commercializing Citizenship in Crisis EU: The Case of Immigrant Investor 
Programmes, 55 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 332, 332 (2017). 
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This Article addresses the various effects that IIPs may have on in- and out-
migration of people and capital, with a special focus on the programs that have 
been recently introduced in some European countries. The purpose of the 
analysis is evaluating whether the benefit that IIPs bring to the host country’s 
economy justifies a multilevel pattern of discrimination that may involve tax 
residents, tax jurisdictions, and immigrants with different levels of wealth. The 
Article is organized as follows: Part I focuses on the main features of IIPs, Part 
II addresses discrimination related to the coexistence of preferential tax 
treatments and IIPs, Part III examines the effects of IIPs in the ambit of global 
(tax) competition, and Part IV approaches the existing disparities in the 
admission of immigrants.  
I.  IMMIGRANT INVESTOR PROGRAMS: CHARACTERISTICS AND PURPOSES 
IIPs are foreign capital attraction measures based on a conditional-exchange 
logic according to which the host country provides to third-country nationals, 
who make substantial investments in the private or in the public sector of the 
host country, a preferential procedure for obtaining the right to live within its 
borders.6 These programs can be very different in scope and characteristics, as 
every state has shaped IIPs in consonance with its specific needs and priorities.7 
There are IIPs that require private sector investments or job creation,8 others in 
which applicants have to invest in the real estate market,9 and still others that 
request the payment of non-refundable fees to the state10 or the purchase of 
regular or low-interest government bonds.11  
Apart from the type of investment and its extent, which can vary 
significantly from country to country, IIPs can also be defined on the grounds of 
 
 6. Gold & El-Ashram, supra note 1, at 49. 
 7. Xu et al., supra note 2, at 4. 
 8. United States, France, Singapore, and the Netherlands apply this kind of IIP. Balakrishnan 
Prabhu, 25+ Immigrant Investor Citizenship Programs in the World, CORPOCRAT MAG. (Oct. 20, 
2015) (Hung.), https://corpocrat.com/2015/10/20/25-immigrant-investor-citizenship-programs-in-
the-world [https://perma.cc/M2V7-C6KD]; International Immigrant Investor Programs, EB5 
INVESTORS, http://www.eb5investors.com/eb5-basics/international-immigrant-investor-programs 
[https://perma.cc/9CW9-8ZLM]. 
 9. This scheme has been adopted by countries such as Latvia, Spain, Greece, Cyprus, and 
Portugal, whose real estate markets have been badly affected by the recent economic crisis. Prabhu, 
supra note 8. 
 10. This is the case of Caribbean islands such as Antigua & Barbuda, St. Kitts and Nevis, and 
Dominica. Id. 
 11. Hungary required investment in no-interest government bonds, but as of April 2017, its 
program is suspended. Hungary Residency Bond Program to Be Indefinitely Suspended from April 
2017, CORPOCRAT MAG., https://corpocrat.com/2017/01/13/hungary-residency-bond-program-to-
be-indefinitely-suspended-from-april-2017/ [https://perma.cc/MW6H-ATLL]. Ireland requires an 
investment in low-interest government bonds, while the United Kingdom and Australia offer 
resident permits in exchange for investment in regular-interest bonds. Prabhu, supra note 8. 
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the different “status” conferred to the investor.12 Some programs allow 
applicants to receive temporary residence permits, which can be renewed and/or 
turned into permanent permits under specific conditions, while others entitle 
investors to directly obtain a second passport and citizenship or a permanent 
residence with—or without—the option to apply for citizenship after a few 
years.13 
The reasons leading wealthy individuals to opt for IIPs can be related to the 
need to find a safe destination for them and their family—especially when they 
come from conflict zones—, to overcome travel restrictions through the new 
residence permit or passport,14 to increase their business activity abroad, and 
also to pay less tax.15 The option to pay less tax is regarded with special attention 
by those individuals who apply for IIPs in Caribbean offshore jurisdictions. 
Dominica, for example, charges almost no taxes to nonresident individuals and 
corporations, has very strict financial privacy laws, and, along with St. Kitts and 
Nevis, allows people of any nationality to form offshore corporations within its 
borders and to open offshore bank accounts.16 
 
 12. Gold & El-Ashram, supra note 1, at 49. 
 13. Id. 
 14. CARRERA, supra note 4, at 5; Parker, supra note 5, at 334 (explaining how IIPs allow 
“greater access to global visa travel”). The opportunity to achieve a permit for travelling around 
Europe is one of the reasons for the popularity of EU Member States’ IIPs. As a matter of fact, by 
providing the immigrant investor with the resident permit, the EU host country opens not only its 
borders, but those of the entire Schengen Zone (composed of 26 EU Member States). Schengen 
Area Countries List, SCHENGEN VISA INFO, https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/schengen-visa-
countries-list/ [https://perma.cc/48 SZ-4P5M]. This circumstance is not regarded as threat to the 
sovereignty of other EU Member States, as long as the IIP does not confer the right to citizenship 
in the absence of a genuine link with the host country. See CARRERA, supra note 4, at 26 (noting 
that the European Commission required Maltese authorities to introduce a “genuine link” prior to 
acquisiton of Maltese nationality). In this respect, the European Commission and the European 
Parliament have taken action against Malta, because, through its IIP, it has conferred Maltese 
citizenship and hence also EU citizenship to individuals who have never resided in the island. Id. 
By arguing that Malta was “selling” the EU citizenship, the European Institutions affirmed that it 
was jeopardizing the duty of sincere cooperation among EU countries and obliged the Maltese 
authorities to modify its IIP. Id. However, such an intervention of the European Institutions did not 
significantly change the situation, because the concept of “genuine link” is still vague and 
discretional: Malta now confers the citizenship after twelve months of residence in the country and 
states such as Bulgaria and Cyprus provide investors with a “fast-track” for achieving citizenship. 
Id. at 30, 42. 
 15. Parker, supra note 5, at 334 (recognizing “important tax advantages” as a benefit of IIPs). 
 16. See DOMINICA CITIZENSHIP BY INV., HTTP://WWW.DOMINICACITIZENSHIPBYINVEST 
MENT.COM/ [https://perma.cc/59AJ-MFGK]; see also G.A. Dwyer Astaphan, Commentary: Who Is 
Really Running St. Kitts-Nevis?, CARIBBEAN NEWS NOW! (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.caribbean 
newsnow.com/topstory-Commentary%3A-Who-is-really-running-St-Kitts-Nevis%3F-20525.html 
[https://perma.cc/RM43-ERFH] (discussing examples of several individuals carrying St. Kitts and 
Nevis passports who are not natives to St. Kitts and Nevis). See generally SUMPTION & HOOPER, 
supra note 5 (discussing the IIPs in Dominica and St. Kitts and Nevis). 
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However, these are not the only states that attract foreign investment due to 
their favorable tax regimes; some European countries lure immigrant investors 
through their tax treatments as well.17 Bulgaria, for example, offers to every tax 
resident a 10% flat tax rate on all income levels,18 while Portugal provides “new” 
tax residents with a preferential tax regime for up to ten years including reduced 
tax rates and exemptions on income earned abroad.19 Similarly, in Cyprus, 
exemptions on dividends, interest, and capital gains on the sale of real estate 
significantly increased the popularity of its IIP,20 and a conspicuous number of 
wealthy immigrants were drawn by the idea of paying zero tax on income earned 
in the island.21 Thus, sometimes, there is no need to invest in a tax haven to 
receive residence permits and lower taxation on worldwide income at the same 
time. Furthermore, if the host country does not consider tax residence as a 
requisite for achieving the right to residency/citizenship, immigrant investors 
can decide where to be taxed on their worldwide income in order to obtain the 
most advantageous tax treatment.22 
II.  IIPS, PREFERENTIAL TAX TREATMENTS, AND DISCRIMINATION AMONG TAX 
RESIDENTS: THE CASE OF PORTUGAL 
The issue regarding the combination of IIPs with preferential tax regimes 
for foreign investors deals with the first hypothesis of discrimination that will be 
examined: Do IIPs generate disparities in the fiscal treatment of tax residents? 
For undertaking this analysis, the Portuguese preferential tax regime has been 
used as a reference sample. 
 
 17. Xu et al., supra note 2, at 6. 
 18. Id. at 6 n.8 
 19. Id. 
 20. LA VIDA GOLDEN VISAS, GOLDEN VISA PROGRAMMES: EUROPE 13 (2017). 
 21. See Mina Pieri, C. Saava & Associates Ltd., Cyprus Non-Domicile Individuals (Non-
Dom), LEXOLOGY (Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=9f927295-18 
bb-433e-bb09-4c452f73798a [https://perma.cc/RK56-SUVY]. On July 16, 2015, Cyprus’ House 
of Representatives amended the Special Defence Contribution (“SDC”) Law and introduced the 
“non-domiciled” individual status. Accordingly, individuals who have not been Cyprus tax 
residents during the twenty years prior to the introduction of the mentioned amendment are not 
subject to the SDC. This means that these tax residents are not taxed in Cyprus on passive interests, 
rental income, and dividends (whether actual or deemed) regardless of the source and regardless of 
whether such income is remitted to a bank account or used in Cyprus. Id. 
 22. See generally LA VIDA, supra note 20. 
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The “non-habitual resident” (“NHR”) tax regime introduced by Portugal in 
2009 and modified in 2012,23 is not an integral part of the IIP24 but represents a 
sort of “added value” to the Portuguese tax system that attracts many investors 
to the country. It applies to individuals25 who have not been tax residents in 
Portugal during the previous five years.26 A NHR is exempt from income 
taxation on foreign-sourced income if such incomes are subject to tax in a 
signatory country of a Double Tax Treaty (“DTT”) with Portugal or, in the 
absence of a DTT, if incomes are subject to tax in another jurisdiction and are 
not considered to be from a Portuguese source.27 Some NHR exemptions apply 
even when foreign-sourced incomes are exempt in the source country because 
they are still considered subject to tax.28 Consequently, under this preferential 
tax regime, cases of double non-taxation are not a remote possibility. In addition, 
it provides a 20% flat rate on employee, business, and professional earnings 
deriving from highly qualified activities carried out in Portugal.29  
 
 23. See Decreto-Lei No. 249/2009, de 23 de Setembro, art. 4, Alteração ao Código do Imposto 
sobre o Rendimento das Pessoas Singulares [Change to Personal Income Tax Code] de 23.09.2009 
(Port.) (adding the “non-habitual resident” tax regime to Article 16 of the Portuguese Individual 
Income Tax Code). Later modified by Lei No. 20/2012, de 14 de Maio, artigo 5, Alteração ao 
Código do Imposto sobre o Rendimento das Pessoas Singulares [Change to Individual Income Tax 
Code] de 14.05.2012 (Port.). 
 24. The IIP applies to non-EU individuals who make an investment either privately or through 
a company of: at least €1,000,000 in a Portuguese company, or by establishing a Portuguese 
company that employs more than ten people, or by purchasing a real estate property with a 
minimum value of €500,000. Frequently Asked Questions by Investors Seeking Residency in 
Portgual, GOLDEN VISA PORTUGAL, http://goldenvisa-portugal.com/FAQ.html [https://perma.cc/6 
FCX-KXDK]. 
 25. According to Article 16, paragraph 1 of the Portuguese Indiviual Income Tax Code, tax 
residents are those who have their habitual residence in Portugal or who spend more than 183 days 
in Portugal in a tax year (Jan. 1st–Dec. 31st) or have/rent a house in Portugal on the 31st of 
December of that year with the intention to hold it as habitual residence. Lei No. 106/2017, de 04 
de setembro, Código do Imposto sobre o Rendimento das Pessoas Singulares [Personal Income Tax 
Code], art. 16(1) (Port.). 
 26. Id. at art. 16(8). 
 27. Id. at art. 16(15). 
 28. See id. at art. 81(3)–(5). 
 29. Código do Imposto sobre o Rendimento das Pessoas Singulares, art. 99(8); Portaria no. 
12/2010, de 7 Janeiro (Port.) (table of activities with high added value qualifiyng for the 20% flat 
rate), https://info.portaldasfinancas.gov.pt/NR/rdonlyres/6071C94D-AD61-4C88-99D9-2C7BD0 
53BBAA/0/Portaria_12_2010_0701.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6EY-D4TB]. Architects, engineers, 
doctors, scientific researchers, people carrying out activities related to information technology and 
computing, designers, directors and top executives are included in this category. Portaria no. 
12/2010, de 7 Janeiro. Tax relief for attracting human capital is far from being an unusual practice: 
the United States and Australia are among the numerous countries which use this method for 
incentivizing the immigration of skilled professionals. F.H. Buckley, The Political Economy of 
Immigration Policies, 16 INT’L REV. LAW & ECON. 81, 81–91 (1996); David Ley, Seeking Homo 
Economicus: The Canadian State and the Strange Story of the Business Immigration Program, 93 
ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS, 426, 426–27 (2003). 
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The NHR tax regime looks like a hybrid treatment, merging aspects of both 
resident and nonresident income taxation, however it cannot be regarded as a 
third and autonomous category of taxpayers. Pursuant to the Portuguese Tax 
Law, NHRs are residents for income tax purposes as every other individual to 
which the general regime applies and their preferential tax treatment is only a 
“fiscal benefit.”30 Portugal, as most of the countries that implement preferential 
taxation for attracting foreign capital, justifies the derived disparity in tax 
treatment as an exception aimed at satisfying a “public interest”: financing the 
expenditure of the state.31 At this point, a controversy may arise around two 
main questions: is not tax fairness a “public interest”? If yes, may the “public 
interest” in favoring the financing of the state outweigh the “public interest” in 
improving tax fairness?  
The relevance provided by the tax systems of democratic countries to the 
principles of equity and ability-to-pay denotes that tax fairness is one of the most 
important “public interests” to be safeguarded, but it is not always clear whether 
it is superior or not to the other, especially when, as in the case of Portugal, the 
domestic economy is in recession.32 Nevertheless, the fact that both are 
generally considered as “public interests” suggests that the state has the duty to 
balance them in a way that the financing of the public expenditure does not end 
in abusive tax discrimination and that safeguarding tax fairness does not lead to 
a decrease in economic efficiency.33  
The tax reforms enacted by Portugal in the period in which the NHR’s 
regime has been introduced does not look in consonance with this approach. In 
the midst of the recent economic crisis, when the IIP appeared for the first time 
in the Portuguese Law, “habitual” residents’ tax rates have been severely 
incremented, and the increase in the burden on low-income taxpayers has been 
more pronounced than in most of the OECD countries.34 To these observations, 
 
 30. Código do Imposto sobre o Rendimento das Pessoas Singulares, art. 16(8)–(9) (qualifying 
as a Portuguese tax resident is necessary to take advantage of NHR regime). Accordingly, “fiscal 
benefit” refers to exceptional measures introduced to promote relevant “public interests” that are 
greater than that of the taxation they prevent. Decreto-Lei No. 22/2017, de 22 de fevereiro, Estatuto 
dos Benefícios Fiscais [Statute of Tax Benefits], art. 2(1) (Port.). 
 31. Marta Filipa Ramos Mendes, O Novo Regime Fiscal do Residente Não Habitual: Análise 
à Luz do Princípio da Não Discriminação no Direito Europeu [The New Fiscal Regime of Non-
Habitual Residents: An Analysis in Light of the Principle of Non-Discrimination in European Law] 
(Aug. 1, 2011) (unpublished L.L.M. dissertation, Universidade do Porto) (on file with author). 
 32. Alison Roberts, Portugal’s Austerity Government Feels the Pinch, BBC NEWS (July 2, 
2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-23154232 [https://perma.cc/GPH4-MFNB]. 
 33. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 268 (1971); see also John G. Head, Tax Fairness 
Principles: A Conceptual, Historical and Practical Review, 9 AUSTRALIAN TAX F. 65, 65–66 
(1992) (advocating an “equitable and efficient” tax structure in order to achieve a fair tax system). 
 34. JOSÉ CASTRO CALDAS, EUR. ECON. & SOC. COMM., THE IMPACT OF “ANTI-CRISIS” 
MEASURES AND THE SOCIAL AND EMPLOYMENT SITUATION: PORTUGAL 11 (2013); ORG. FOR 
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which highlight that the disparities in the distribution of wealth and the tax 
burden went far beyond the provision of a preferential regime for “new” tax 
residents, it should be added that the austerity measures implemented for 
stemming the crisis also involved a substantial reduction in personal income tax 
allowances.35 It can be said, therefore, that Portugal has prioritized economic 
efficiency, even to the detriment of tax fairness.  
These considerations confirm that, even when preferential regimes for 
“new” tax residents are aimed at satisfying a public interest, they may be 
inconsistent with the fundaments of tax fairness, especially in those contexts in 
which wealth and tax burden are not equally distributed among the population. 
However, does the problem involve IIPs?  
Undoubtedly, in a world in which taxation was the same everywhere, the 
amount of tax levied by the host country would not be an element to be taken 
into account while choosing where to apply for an IIP. However, since that is 
not the case, tax matters. Those states that do not offer tax incentives to foreign 
investors are likely to entice less wealthy immigrants than neighboring countries 
with attractive tax regimes. Accordingly, it is not surprising that those who want 
to obtain the right to live in the EU by investing in real estate and maintain, at 
the same time, some capital in their country of origin, tend to choose the 
Portuguese IIP rather than that of Spain.36  
Thus, the issue regarding preferential regimes and disparities in the tax 
treatment of resident taxpayers involves IIPs, as long as these programs are the 
vehicle for attracting a group of “privileged tax residents.” In point of fact, many 
of these tax residents would not be there without the combination of IIPs and 
preferential tax regimes.  
Nevertheless, when it comes to migration inside the EU, the situation may 
be different. Since EU citizens do not need IIPs in order to reside in another EU 
member state,37 become a tax resident in that country, and take advantage of its 
favorable tax regime, preferential tax treatments will continue to generate 
disparities even in the absence of IIPs. Hence, it can be concluded that 
preferential tax regimes are responsible for creating discrimination among tax 
residents, while IIPs are responsible for increasing the cases in which such 
discrimination takes place. 
 
ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], TAX POLICY REFORMS IN THE OECD 2016, at 32–33 
(2016). 
 35. CALDAS, supra note 34, at 6. 
 36. The Spanish IIP, as will be broadly explained, is very similar to the Portuguese one; 
however, in Spain there are no particular tax incentives for investors who decide to apply. Golden 
Visa Comparison: Portugal vs. Spain, LUGNA, https://www.lugna.pt/goldenvisa-portugalspain/ 
[https://perma.cc/7N78-JUJY]. 
 37. Council Directive 2004/38, art. 7, 2004 O.J. (L 158) 77, 93–94 (EC). 
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III.  IIPS AND GLOBAL (TAX) COMPETITION 
The discussion on preferential taxation necessarily draws the attention to 
international tax competition, an argument that strictly involves the attraction of 
capital—the raison d’être of IIPs. As mentioned, IIPs exist in a world with 
different tax systems and, capital and people being mobile, the way in which one 
state exercises its taxing power may have repercussions on other states.38 This 
mobility turns tax treatments into commodities that states commercialize in the 
global market at a fair price, in order to maintain “habitual customers” (e.g., tax 
residents), and/or at a discounted price to attract “new customers” (e.g., 
investors).39  
In a context in which states must compete to defend or increment their taxing 
power, the function of preferential regimes and, in general, of tax systems, is to 
attract “new customers,” and the purpose of IIPs is preventing extra-fiscal 
restrictions (e.g., migration rules) to hinder such attraction. IIPs become, 
therefore, the instrument of a tax competition that can be harmful. In general, it 
can be said that IIPs lead to harmful tax competition when they are included in 
the legal system of a state offering a wide range of fiscal advantages for 
attracting mobile capital, without minding their licit or illicit nature, and in the 
absence of transparency and effective exchange of information with other 
jurisdictions.40 This circumstance is common in offshore tax jurisdictions such 
as Dominica and St. Kitts and Nevis, where IIPs are usually the gateway to an 
excessively tax-friendly environment,41 while in countries like Portugal and 
Cyprus, the active fiscal and financial cooperation with other jurisdictions and 
the limited extent of the preferential tax regime do not turn their IIPs into 
instruments of harmful tax competition. However, it cannot be said that 
cooperative countries do not create a climate of tax competition that, albeit non-
harmful, reduce the ability of other states to attract foreign capital through IIPs.42 
This leads one to ask: Why are there countries implementing IIPs without 
providing for preferential tax regimes for foreign investors?  
The existence of IIPs is necessarily an indicator of the clear intention of 
some states to attract more foreign capital. However, the argument regarding the 
link between IIPs and competition goes beyond taxation because not every 
 
 38. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the 
Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1575–76 (2000). 
 39. See Vito Tanzi, Globalization, Tax Systems, and the Architecture of the Global Economic 
System, in TAXATION AND LATIN AMERICAN INTEGRATION 403, 404 (Vito Tanzi et al. eds., 2008). 
 40. Patricia Lampreave, Fiscal Competitiveness Versus Harmful Tax Competition in the 
European Union, 65 BULL. FOR INT’L TAX’N 6, 8–9, 11 (2011). 
 41. Duncan Tucker, The High Price of ‘Citizenship by Investment’ in the Carribean, 
NEARSHORE AMERICAS (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.nearshoreamericas.com/citizenship-invest 
ment-programs-caribbean-fdi/ [https://perma.cc/Y4MV-ZVSQ]. 
 42. See Tanzi, supra note 39, at 404 (“[T]ax competition aims to make a particular location 
. . . more attractive than other locations . . . .”). 
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immigrant investor makes its choice on the basis of tax considerations. The cost-
benefit calculus that leads a wealthy individual to apply for the IIP of one 
country rather than another may include a variety of factors, which widens the 
competitive scenario.43 For example, those states that have broad welfare 
systems, flourishing economies, and political stability do not need to lure 
investors through tax incentives. They can eliminate the risk to discriminate 
among taxpayers by taxing “new” and “habitual” tax residents in the same 
manner and even require—without losing their seductive power—that 
immigrant investors contribute more actively to economic growth by creating 
jobs. Conversely, countries with a less favorable economic and socio-political 
situation may rely on their ability to offer more investment and mobility options 
due to agreements on trade and free movement, on their good weather and 
beautiful landscapes, or, finally, on preferential tax treatment. These kinds of 
states compete among each other in order to become the top destination for 
wealthy individuals. They also compete with other countries that may have 
different schemes for attracting investment, because, in reality, the peculiarities 
of each state and capital mobility are the true factors that generate competition.  
Hence, it can be argued that competition is a systemic element in a 
diversified global environment, and it can be harmful when artificial and abusive 
mechanisms are used for obtaining undue benefits. Nonetheless, even when 
competition is non-harmful, it may be unfair if it gives rise to discrimination 
both at the national and at the international level. IIPs would not exist if every 
country did not have its peculiarities and if capital was immovable.44 Thus, they 
necessarily create competition, but it is up to states that have IIPs to avoid such 
competition that ends in abuses and in differentiation between first-class and 
second-class individuals. 
IV.  IIPS AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST IMMIGRANTS: THE CASE OF SPAIN 
AND THE EU MIGRANT CRISIS 
The argument regarding the discrimination caused by IIPs has already been 
addressed in reference to tax residents of countries that offer preferential regimes 
to foreign investors; however, the issue is not limited to this case. The existence 
of such programs also tends to highlight that there are two categories of 
immigrants: the “wanted” and the “rejected,” the “beneficial” and the 
“burdensome,” those who can buy a better life and those who have to struggle 
to achieve it, the rich and the poor.  
Paradoxically, immigrant investors can be considered either economic 
migrants, individuals who leave their countries of origin for a new destination 
 
 43. See id. at 404–05 (discussing several elements that make a particular location attractive). 
 44. See Tanzi, supra note 39, at 404 (explaining how a country’s tax base is no longer limited 
by that country’s territory, which allows countries to attract foreign financial capital, foreign real 
capital, foreign consumers, foreign workers, and foreign individuals with high incomes). 
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offering better economic conditions,45 and/or refugees, individuals that might 
have been forced to emigrate because their lives were at risk in their countries.46 
In Europe, where the current migrant emergency involves both economic 
migrants and refugees, the discriminatory effect of IIPs may appear quite 
pronounced.  
Almost half of EU member states have specific programs for attracting 
immigrant investors,47 and each state, in the exercise of its sovereignty, has been 
free to design the IIP in the way that best suits its needs. The situation is 
completely different with regard to non-investor immigrants, since the entry and 
the stay of third-country nationals is regulated by common rules that every 
member state had to endorse as a requirement for joining the EU.48 The 
difference in the approach to immigration is clearly reflected in the Spanish legal 
system, where the rules concerning the admission of immigrant investors are 
included in the Ley de Apoyo a los Emprendedores y su Internacionalización 
[Law for Supporting Entrepreneurs and their Internationalization],49 while the 
requirements that the other foreigners should fulfill to access the country are 
established by the Ley de Extranjería [Immigration Law].50  
According to Ley de Apoyo a los Emprendedores y su Internacionalización, 
which has been recently modified by the Ley no. 25/2015,51 an investor visa 
valid for one year is provided to immigrants who either directly or through a 
 
 45. As affirmed by Anne Althaus: “The term ‘economic migrant’ has no legal definition. It is 
not mentioned in any international instruments of migration law. . . . [It] is nevertheless commonly 
used in the public discourse, [and] . . . [i]t frequently implies that the migrant has freely decided to 
move with the only aim of improving their financial situation . . . .” Anne Althaus, Opinion, The 
False Dichotomy Between ‘Economic Migrants’ and Refugees, NEW WORLD, no. 1, 2016, at 10. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Gold & El-Ashram, supra note 1, at 48–49. 
 48. There is, in fact, a common norm within the EU that prevents Member States from 
allowing entry and stay to third-country nationals. Exceptions are made mainly for those who enter 
without lucrative purposes, those who already have a signed employment contract, those carrying 
out highly qualified activities, and refugees. See Council Directive 2001/40, art. 3, 2001 O.J. (L 
149) 34, 35 (EC); Council Directive 2003/109, art. 3, 2003 O.J. (L 16) 44, 46 (EC); Council 
Directive 2009/50, art. 1, 2009 O.J. (L 155) 17, 20 (EC); Council Directive 2011/98, art. 1, 2011 
O.J. (L 343) 1, 4 (EU); Council Directive 2014/36, art. 1, 2014 O.J. (L 94) 375, 380 (EU); Council 
Directive, 2016/801, art. 1, 2, 2016 O.J. (L 132) 21, 29 (EU). 
 49. Ley de Apoyo a los Emprendedores y su Internacionalización [Law for Supporting 
Entrepreneurs and their Internationalization] art. 61 (B.O.E. 2013, 14) (Spain) [hereinafter Ley de 
Emprendedores]. 
 50. Ley Sobre Derechos y Libertades de los Extranjeros en España y su Integración Social 
[Law on the Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners in Spain and their Social Integration] art. 25 
(B.O.E. 2000, 4) (Spain) [hereinafter Ley de Extranjería]. 
 51. See Ley de Mecanismo de Segunda Oportunidad, Reducción de la Carga Financiera y 
Otras Medidas de Orden Social [Second Chance Mechanism Act, Reduction of Financial Burden 
and Other Measures of Social Order] (B.O.E. 2015, 25) (Spain) (including a modification to the IIP 
aimed at giving “a second chance” to a project that has brought to Spain little foreign capital). 
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company: (a) invest €2,000,000 in Spanish government bonds, €1,000,000 in 
shares of Spanish companies, or deposit €1,000,000 in a Spanish bank account; 
(b) purchase a real estate property with a minimum value of €500,000; or (c) 
undertake in Spain a business project that is regarded as being of general interest 
(e.g., creation of jobs, relevant socioeconomic impact in the territory, scientific 
and/or technological innovation).52 The foreign investors can then apply for a 
residence permit, which is valid for two years and renewable for two-year 
periods, provided that they have travelled to Spain at least once during the 
period, that they still meet the initial minimum investment requirements, and 
have complied with tax and Social Security obligations.53 Investor visas with a 
maximum duration of six months are also provided to foreigners that have 
accessed Spanish territory with a tourist visa (ninety-days maximum stay) and 
who have not yet formalized the investment.54 
Conversely, the Ley de Extranjería, as every other immigrant law of EU 
Member States, establishes that the entry and the temporary residency is allowed 
only for non-lucrative purposes.55 Additionally, evidence must be provided of 
the reason for and conditions under which foreigners are entering Spain, as well 
as evidence of financial support for their time of stay in the country or the ability 
to procure such funds legally.56 A temporary permit for working reasons is 
released only to those foreigners who prove with a project and their financial 
means that they are going to start a business activity in Spain, or, in rare 
occasions, to those who have signed an employment contract for occupying 
specific posts listed by the Spanish Government.57 This permit allows foreigners 
to apply for a special visa at the consulate of Spain in their country of origin in 
order to access Spanish territory.58 Depending on the type of temporary permit, 
it can be renewed provided that the foreigner is working or has sufficient 
economic means for residing in Spain.59 Other residence permits may be issued 
on the grounds of exceptional situations for international or humanitarian 
protection; cooperation with authorities; national security; public interest; 
female victims of gender-based violence; and collaboration with authorities 
against organized crime and human trafficking networks.60 
The Spanish Law provides formal and practical evidence, by means of 
separate regulations and different requirements for entering and staying in the 
territory of the Kingdom, that immigrant investors are different from every other 
 
 52. Ley de Emprendedores art. 63. 
 53. Id. at arts. 66–67. 
 54. Id. at art. 66. 
 55. See Ley de Extranjería arts. 25, 30, 33. 
 56. See id. at art. 25. 
 57. Id. at arts. 37–38. 
 58. Id. at art. 25 bis. 
 59. Id. at art. 31. 
 60. Ley de Extranjería arts. 31 bis, 33–35. 
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foreigner. Such a distinction indicates that a derogation from the EU common 
regulations on immigration and from the principle of equal treatment established 
by Article 20 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, and also by 
Article 14 of the Spanish Constitution, is possible when the discrimination 
entails an economic benefit to the country.61 This definition is made, however, 
a priori and is grounded on the idea that, unlike other foreigners who want to 
live and work in the EU, an immigrant investor may bring to the host country 
more benefits than problems. But is this always true? Undoubtedly, economic 
migrants who illegally reach the EU are different than those who enter with a 
“golden visa” because they are poorer and more in need of public services, but 
what will be the impact of both categories in the long term?  
Nobody can say if immigrant investors will contribute forever to the 
economic growth of the host country. What will the consequences be if they 
leave, and, conversely, what effect may the inclusion of other economic migrants 
have in the future? It has been said, especially in reference to those countries in 
which IIPs provide an important share of revenue, that the potential loss of this 
resource is able to provoke an economic crisis.62 Others affirm that in the 
absence of economic migrants, the drop in the birth rate and increasing life 
expectancy will lead to a crisis of welfare systems caused by an over-aged 
overall population.63 Nevertheless, it does not seem that these considerations 
influence actual immigration policies because, as in the case of the tax resident 
discrimination, the positive impact of the entry of immigrant investors is taken 
for granted.  
However, there is a negative impact of IIPs that most of the EU Member 
States have taken into account: the likelihood of illicit capital entering EU 
territory. In point of fact, it cannot be overlooked that if the host country cannot 
access all the information related to capital invested within its territory, it is 
exposed to the danger of being involved in financial crimes and, in particular, 
money-laundering.64 The issue is particularly problematic in the Caribbean, 
 
 61. CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA, B.O.E. art. 14, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain) (“Spaniards are equal 
before the law and may not in any way be discriminated against on account of birth, race, sex, 
religion, opinion or any other personal or social condition or circumstance.”); CHRISTOPHER 
MCCRUDDEN & SACHA PRECHAL, EUR. NETWORK OF LEGAL EXPERTS IN THE FIELD OF GENDER 
EQUAL., THE CONCEPTS OF EQUALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATION IN EUROPE: A PRACTICAL 
APPROACH 9 n.53 (2009). The equality clause in Article 20 of the European Charter of Fundamental 
Rights states: “Everyone is equal before the law.” Id. 
 62. Xu et al., supra note 2, at 9–10. 
 63. OECD, IS MIGRATION GOOD FOR THE ECONOMY? 3, 4 (Migration Pol’y Debates, May 
2014); see Marshall Fitz, Philip E. Wolgin & Patrick Oakford, Immigrants Are Makers, Not Takers, 
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Feb. 8, 2013, 10:01 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/im 
migration/news/2013/02/08/52377/immigrants-are-makers-not-takers [https://perma.cc/6LWF-JG 
X7] (explaining how immigrants in the United States “are a key driver of keeping the Social 
Security Trust Fund solvent”). 
 64. Xu et al., supra note 2, at 23. 
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where the low level of fiscal and financial transparency may turn IIPs into an 
instrument for laundering illicit capital.65 
Within the EU, the risk of introducing illicit money has been reduced 
through the application of the Anti-Money Laundering Directive and the specific 
requirement to invest via bank accounts opened in the host country.66 Due to 
these regulations, credit institutions are obliged to collect information on their 
customers and implement strict controls over their transactions.67  
The impact of the directive toward IIPs has been different depending on how 
it has been enforced in each Member State. Where credit institutions have not 
been too strict in their controls, some cases of money laundering have arisen,68 
while in other Member States excessive risk prevention has been considered as 
a determinant of a reduction in potential investors.69 These considerations, 
however, do not regard Hungary, whose vicissitudes related to immigrant 
investors have been completely different from those of the rest of EU Member 
States. Hungary’s IIP, introduced in 2012, provided permanent residency to 
foreign individuals who bought government bonds, but the evidence shows that 
the program was only an artificial mechanism for the benefit of a few 
companies.70 During the entire application period of the IIP, which lasted until 
the thirty-first of March 2017, credit institutions exercised no real control over 
the origin of the capital invested, and public authorities were involved in the 
 
 65. Despite the U.S. Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s (“FinCEN”) 
warning on the likelihood that the IIPs of St. Kitts and Nevis were being used for abusive purposes 
and announced sanctions against the country, the governments of the Caribbean have not changed 
their approach toward foreign investors and there is still lax control over their activities. See 
FINANCIAL CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FIN-2014-A004, ADVISORY: 
ABUSE OF THE CITIZENSHIP-BY-INVESTMENT PROGRAM SPONSORED BY THE FEDERATION OF ST. 
KITTS AND NEVIS (2014). 
 66. See Council Directive 2015/849, art. 1, 2015 O.J. (L 141) 73, 83 (EU) (amending the 
Regulation 648/2012/EU and repealing Directives 2005/60/EC and 2006/70/EC). 
 67. See id. at art. 1, 2. 
 68. Henrique Almeida, Chinese Stuck in Portugal’s Visa Limbo, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 21, 2016, 
6:24 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-20/chinese-property-buy ers-stuck-
in-portugal-s-golden-visa-limbo [https://perma.cc/WD4V-QP9W]. 
 69. Antonio Flores, Spanish Banks Shut Doors to Iranian Investors, BELEGAL.COM: BLOG 
(Sept. 26, 2013), http://belegal.com/blog-by-antonio-flores/spanish-banks-shut-doors-to-iranian-
investors/ [https://perma.cc/RA63-9Y47] (discussing how Spanish banks have refused to open bank 
accounts for Iranian nationals even though there is no specific regulation requiring them to do so). 
Malta does not seem to fear the loss in investments and in addition to the anti-money laundering 
control, the government authorities undergo the “fit and proper” test, a four-tier due diligence 
process in which checks are conducted with the International Criminal Court, INTERPOL, and 
various other authorities. MALTA IMMIGRATION, HTTP://WWW.MALTAIMMIGRATION.COM/ 
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/FFK7-VEPM]. 
 70. BOLDIZSÁR NAGY, INV. MIGRATION COUNCIL & TRANSPARENCY INT’L HUNG., IN 
WHOSE INTEREST?: SHADOWS OVER THE HUNGARIAN RESIDENCY BOND PROGRAM 8, 11 (2016). 
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corruption.71 The reasons related to the suspension of the program, which is 
probably the beginning of a procedure of abrogation, are unclear; some affirm 
that the country had no economic need for the IIP, others that the corruption 
scandal became too big,72 and there is also a part of the public that considers the 
IIP’s suspension as a confirmation of the anti-immigrant and anti-refugee 
attitude of the government.73 
The latter point brings back the discourse to the wider issue of immigration 
and discrimination because in the migrant crisis affecting the EU as a 
consequence of the conflicts and political instability in the Middle East and 
Africa, the behavior of Hungary toward refugees has not been an exception.74 In 
particular, it should be pointed out that some EU Member States that 
demonstrated considerable interest in integrating immigrant investors into their 
territory are not being similarly open to refugees. 
Although refugees, according to EU law, are entitled to achieve the right to 
reside and work within the EU under the same conditions as Member State 
citizens,75 such treatment is by far not comparable to the treatment provided by 
some Member States to immigrant investors. A noteworthy element of 
comparison in this regard concerns the duration of the procedures for obtaining 
the right to live in EU Member States. On average, in the EU, the period for 
processing IIP applications and issuing investor residence permits does not 
exceed three months,76 while the period for asylum almost always fails to 
comply with the six-month deadline envisioned by the EU Asylum Procedures 
Directive.77 The inefficiency of EU Member States in concluding asylum 
processes in a reasonable timeframe has been regarded with special concern by 
the EU Commission, which, in order to find a solution for alleviating the burden 
that the exceptional flow of refugees brought to Italy and Greece, decided to 
adopt the European Agenda on Migration in May 2015.78 Thus, 160,000 
refugees that arrived on the Italian and Greek coasts between 2014 and 2015 
should have been quickly relocated in the other EU Member States according to 
 
 71. See id. at 11. 
 72. CORPOCRAT MAG., supra note 11. 
 73. See Christian Keszthelyi, Hungary to End Sales of Residency Bonds, BUDAPEST BUS. J. 
(Oct. 27, 2016), https://bbj.hu/politics/hungary-to-end-sales-of-residency-bonds_124017 
[https://perma.cc/6FQV-Y7H2]. 
 74. Claus Hecking, EU Immigration: Only the Rich Are Welcome, SPIGEL ONLINE (Oct. 8, 
2013 10:37 AM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/immigrants-buy-visas-in-latvia-as-
eurpoe-locks-out-the-poor-a-926543.html [https://perma.cc/4WNV-4ZPC]. 
 75. See Council Directive 2011/51, art. 1, 2011 O.J. (L 132) 1, 2 (EU) (amending Directive 
2003/109/EC). 
 76. See LA VIDA, supra note 20, at 6. 
 77. Council Directive 2013/32, art. 31, 2013 O.J. (L 180) 60, 77 (EU). 
 78. Theresa Papademetriou, Refugee Law and Policy: European Union, LAW LIBR. CONG. 
(June 21, 2016), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/refugee-law/europeanunion.php [https://perma.cc/ 
DS5D-9JNR]. 
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a quota plan.79 The apportionment took into account the size, economy, and 
population of each country and aimed at fairly distributing the refugees, but 
many Member States opposed the measure.80 Among them, three had IIPs: 
United Kingdom, Ireland, and Hungary.81  
These claims have caused important delays in refugee relocation, and most 
of the refugees are still in Italy and Greece.82 In contrast, no IIPs have been 
suspended due to the refugee crisis.83 Such a diverging approach toward 
immigrant investors and refugees is clearly reflected in the case of Malta, the 
only EU Member State that establishes a specific quota of IIP applications per 
annum. This amount, 1,800 immigrant investors,84 looks shocking not only in 
the light of the quota of 425 refugees that the EU plan allotted to the island,85 
but especially for the fact that, despite the high requirements of its IIP, every 
year Malta undertakes to admit a large number of immigrant investors while, by 
March 2017, the refugee quota had not been met.86 
CONCLUSION 
In a time in which countries are increasingly sensitive to the need to promote 
a culture of transparency, integrity, and fairness, the implementation of IIPs 
seems in many cases to contradict the efforts aimed at countering abuses and 
discrimination.  
Introduction of control mechanisms, the presence of small-scale migration 
flows, and provision of generous welfare systems are conditions able to 
overshadow the detrimental consequences of many IIPs, but these circumstances 
do not always accompany IIPs in every country they are found.  
 
 79. Id. The EU adopted its refugee redistribution scheme in September 2015. Jean-Michael 
Hauteville et al., EU Refugee Quotas Failing Despite Landmark Ruling, HANDELSBLATT GLOBAL 
(Sept. 7 2017, 3:02 PM), https://global.handelsblatt.com/politics/eu-refugee-quotas-failing-despite 
-landmark-ruling-823289 [https://perma.cc/JD5E-GX3Y]. 
 80. Papademetriou, supra note 78. 
 81. Council Decision 2015/1601, ¶¶ 46, 47, 2015 O.J. (L 248) 80, 86 (EU) (showing United 
Kingdom and Ireland opposing the measure); Papademetriou, supra note 78 (showing Hungary 
opposing the measure). 
 82. Papademetriou, supra note 78. As of September, 2017, more than 90,000 refugess are still 
waiting in Italy and Greece. Hauteville et al., supra note 79. 
 83. Cf. CORPORCRAT MAG., supra note 11 (showing that Hungary suspended its programs for 
reasons not related to the refugee crisis). 
 84. Xu et al., supra note 2, at 7. 
 85. Tom Batchelor, MAPPED: How Many Refugees Each European Country Will Take Under 
EU Plan, EXPRESS (May 16, 2016) (U.K.), http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/607349/Migrant 
-crisis-map-EU-refugee-quota [http://perma.cc/7HQL-JP8E]. 
 86. Member States’ Support to Emergency Relocation Mechanism, EUR. UNION (Nov. 2, 
2017), https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-a 
genda-migration/press-material/docs/state_of_play_-_relocation_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/UR9G-
ZFZQ]. 
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The noticeable influence of these programs on in- and out-migration of 
individuals and capital has, as a consequence, resulted in the polarization of both 
migrants and states. IPPs, in fact, tend to reveal the existence of a wealthier class 
of migrants—able to invest in order to skip standard procedures for obtaining 
residence permits—and to show that the provision of preferential treatment is 
apt to turn states into “top destinations.” Such polarization does not arise from 
the willingness to damage a group of migrants or from attempts to undermine 
the economy of other countries. Rather, by implementing IIPs, host countries 
pursue economic benefits without paying any mind to many of their potential 
detrimental consequences. 
It can be said that IIPs attract only a limited number of individuals and 
amount of capital and that, for this reason, their removal would be irrelevant in 
the struggle for global justice. It can be also argued that in the absence of IIPs 
there would still be means for shifting capital to “tax friendly” jurisdictions. 
Undoubtedly, major problems affect the world and IIPs are only drops in an 
ocean of inequality spirals that prevent individuals from having the same 
resources available for leading their lives and states from having the same 
instruments for competing at the global level.87 
After the Great Recession of 2007–08, there was an increasing interest in all 
states toward the elimination of global economic mismatches, and important 
achievements have been made in terms of tax justice, transparency, and 
cooperation. These efforts were focused on major issues such as the fight against 
aggressive tax planning, and small ones, like IIPs, have been wisely left aside. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the negative effects of IIPs are more 
tolerable than those of other abusive practices, or that states should remain 
indifferent to the discrimination they generate. 
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